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Abstract:  
This study examines the impact of the quality of board members’ training on the financial 
performance of Portuguese banks. The study employs a sample of 276 board members.  
 
Financial ratios such as return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity 
(ROAE) are used as measures for gauging banks’ financial performance. Three indexes are 
used as proxies for board members’ educational qualifications, specifically: Eduindex, for 
all academic qualifications obtained in areas such as business or economics; EduindexDP, 
for all qualifications obtained in prestigious domestic business schools; and EduindexFP, for 
all qualifications obtained in prestigious foreign business schools.  
The study findings have important policy implications, specifically a positive and significant 
impact on the bank’s financial performance from having board members holding degrees 
from prestigious foreign business schools. In particular, the findings suggest that the 
prudential supervision developed by Banco de Portugal in cooperation with the European 
Central Bank should include a more rigorous process in the selection of board members. The 
present study is one of the first attempts in the literature emphasizing all these aspects 
simultaneously, that is, the banking sector, quality of board members’ training, and 
Eduniversal Rankings, in the context in which all the banks of a specific country are 
analysed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Banks are an essential part of an economy, and the governance of banks themselves 
is central to a country’s economic development as most businesses and individuals 
depend on the services banks offer. The importance of the banking sector is widely 
recognised and its central role in the everyday activities of businesses and 
individuals is relevant to the present analysis and emphasizes the importance of this 
study. 
 
Banks have specific characteristics that make them different from other firms. First, 
banks have a higher level of opacity associated with the services they sell than other 
industries. Second, a central bank is a national authority that regulates the country’s 
banking system; for instance, most European banks are co-regulated by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). These two main aspects justify a major development 
for the existing body of research, which considers banks as a sample. 
 
Over the years leading up to the financial crisis that started in the US in 2007, many 
banks registered serious problems while several experienced massive defaults and 
bailouts. This can be attributed to widespread failures that banks allowed to grow 
internally and within the system. Perhaps, it is a combination of an overcapacity – 
excess employees and a larger branch network – an oversized banking system, or the 
dramatic failures in corporate governance, yet to be highlighted, that contributed to 
the crisis. Taking this last reality into account, many experts concluded that failures 
in corporate governance planning that encourage aggressive risk taking are mainly 
responsible for the events that led to financial crisis in 2007. For example, 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009) implicated the various lapses in corporate governance as one of 
the reasons for the 2007 global financial crisis. As Kruglikova et al. (2018) state, the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed the imperfection of the banking regulatory 
system. 
 
Adams and Mehran’s (2012) study on corporate governance in banks emphasized 
the strong need for taking into account the particularities of banks when 
implementing corporate governance reforms. Lawton and Nestor (2010), who are 
recognized corporate governance experts, argued that very few jurisdictions had 
devised extensive bank-specific governance requirements. Thalassinos et al. (2011) 
integrate corporate governance as one of five banks responsibilities’ categories when 
the measuring the bank’s financial health is intended. In the context of corporate 
governance crises in banks and in terms of certain intrinsic factors that are essential 
for its understanding, more research is required in the pursuit of solutions for 
problems and difficulties emergent in corporate governance of banks.  
 
This study examines several aspects related to the influence of boards of directors on 
banks’ performance during the financial crisis. In particular, this study analyses if 
the quality of training for board members significantly influences banks’ 
performance. 
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With this objective, there are several orders of reasons justifying the relevance of the 
present research. The reasons are as follows: 
 
• First, studies focusing on the quality of board members’ training are 
relatively few and comprehension of this phenomenon is limited for banks’ 
supervisors.  
• Second, the majority of the current state-of-the-art considers the variable 
‘education’ in terms of quantity but not quality by using globally accepted 
rankings such as Eduniversal rankings.  
• Third, a significant part of the existing literature does not consider all the 
banks operating in a single country (samples only consider public-traded 
banks).  
• Fourth, this study uses hand-collected data from the annual reports of banks 
and other sources such as Zoominfo, a leading database provider. This 
ensures the development of a highly representative and rigorous research.  
• Fifth, the Portuguese banking system can be used as a natural experiment 
since it registered several problems after the 2007 financial crisis, with 
many banks rescued such as Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) or Banco 
Espírito Santo (BES).  
 
The more relevant literature on the quality of training of members of banks’ board of 
directors is by (Chevalier and Ellison 1999), who examined the quality of 
undergraduate institutions (e.g. higher-Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) by using a 
sample of 492 fund managers. The mutual funds studied were listed in Morningstar, 
a global investment research and investment management firm headquartered in the 
US. The authors concluded that mutual fund managers from more selective 
undergraduate institutions registered higher performance than those from less 
selective ones. Moreover, (Golec, 1996) studied the impact of mutual fund 
managers’ characteristics on their portfolio performance and argued that investors 
can expect better risk-adjusted performance from younger managers with Master of 
Business Administration (MBA) degrees. In turn, (Fich, 2005) defended that 
academic backgrounds of appointees are not significantly related to the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) obtained. The study results were obtained from research 
examining if outside directors are better than others in a sample of directors from 
Fortune 1000 firms.  
 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) studied the influence of manager education on mutual 
fund performance and showed that the mean graduate management admission test 
(GMAT) score for an MBA programme is positively and significantly related to 
fund performance. Their research also shows that did not find a significant the effect 
of other educational variables on mutual fund performance, such as a CFA 
designation or a PhD degree, was largely insignificant. According to Kauko (2009) 
vocational level qualification in business administration apparently is the best 
education in the case of very small banks, while preceding research shows that a 
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university degree is the best option for larger banks. Finally, Haitao et al. (2011) 
argue that hedge fund managers with higher-SAT scores from undergraduate 
institutions take fewer risks and contribute towards improved raw and risk-adjusted 
returns and more inflows. 
 
At least two gaps are detected in the literature. First, the present state-of-the-art 
review does not consider global business education rankings. The empirical studies 
mainly focussed on US universities and do not considering if managers acquired 
their degrees from a prestigious European university. Second, further research is 
needed to study board members’ quality of training and its influence on banks’ 
performance considering global business education rankings. Therefore, this study 
intends to analyse if the quality of training of members on the boards of Portuguese 
banks is relevant to banks’ performance using the Eduniversal rankings.  
 
This study’s contribution to the existing literature emphasizes corporate governance 
in banks, which continues to be limited. This study allows a better understanding of 
the relationship between the quality of board members’ education and banks’ 
performance. The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the literature review and hypotheses development and Section 3 describes the data 
and methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, Section 5 provides the 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
2.1 Directors’ educational level and banks’ financial performance 
 
In the literature, there is a strand of research that studies the possible effects of 
directors’ education on company performance. Overall, the results are inconclusive 
and further research is required. On the one hand, Hau and Thum (2010) argue that 
board members’ education does not have a significant correlation with bank losses. 
On the other hand, Nguyen et al. (2015) show that executive education creates 
shareholder wealth in the US banking sector. Likewise, there is a line of research 
that only considers financial firms as the sample and relevant literature is scarce, 
especially for banks in this case (Baldacchino et al., 2017; Grima et al., 2017; 
Mahboud, 2017). 
 
While studying the impact of mutual fund managers’ characteristics on their 
portfolio performance, Golec (1996) reasoned that investors can expect better risk-
adjusted performance from younger managers with an MBA degree. Similarly, 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) found that managers with an MBA status do not 
register significantly better performance than those without such qualifications. 
Interestingly, (Kauko, 2009) discovered that in the case of very small banks, 
vocational-level qualification in business administration is apparently the best form 
of education. The preceding research holds that a university degree is the best option 
in the case of larger banks. A study by Hau and Thum (2010), covering the effects of 
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the educational background of supervisory board members of German banks, 
showed that on average board members’ education does not have a significant 
correlation with bank losses. In their study covering the German banking sector, 
Berger et al. (2014) found that portfolio risk declines when board changes increase 
the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees. Additionally, (Nguyen, 
Hagendorff, and Eshraghi 2015) argued that the education of executives creates 
shareholder wealth in the US banking sector. However, this study also revealed that 
no measurable market returns were registered for the particular case of an MBA 
degree.  
 
Pereira and Filipe (2015) while studying the Portuguese banking system, identified a 
significant impact of an educational index in terms of banks’ return on average 
equity (ROAE), but the same impact did not persist when banks’ return on average 
assets (ROAA) was used. Similarly, King et al. (2016) argued that CEO educational 
attainment, considering both level and quality, is relevant for bank performance. 
This study used a sample of CEOs from publicly-listed US banks during the period 
from 1992 to 2011. Another study from Fernandes et al. (2017b) emphasized that 
directors’ qualifications may affect banks’ performance, and if the level of directors’ 
qualifications are higher, they will be capable of making better corporate decisions. 
The previous aspect is more relevant for banks in which the complexity of their 
activity is higher than others. In this research, the authors used a sample of 72 
publicly-listed European banks. Using a sample of the largest financial firms in the 
US, (Gande and Kalpathy, 2017) found that the presence of a CEO with an MBA 
from a top 20 business school positively improves a bank’s buy and hold returns.  
 
From the literature analysis it is possible to expose some significant review articles 
that emphasized the importance of examining the competencies of board members 
on bank corporate governance. For example, Ahrens et al. (2011) argued that future 
research on corporate governance should consider the concept of ‘economic 
competence’ using a more relevant approach, aiming to measure board members’ 
competencies (e.g. experience or education). On this track, Hopt (2013) argued that 
‘qualification’ or ‘experience’ of bank board members is, in fact, more important 
than their ‘independence’, representing a variable much investigated by many 
authors. Cited by Larcker and Tayan (2015), Sheila Bair (former chair of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation of the US) said ‘...it´s really more about the people 
and whether they are competent and setting the right tone and culture’.  
 
Furthermore, De Masi, and Paci (2016) argued that the current literature on banks’ 
corporate governance is inconclusive on the effect of financial expertise on banks’ 
performance. They suggested that future research should consider additional 
variables such as board interlocks and directors’ networks. Finally, Fernandes et al. 
(2017a) concluded that lack of financial expertise on banks’ boards could be a 
relevant factor in the 2007 financial crisis. 
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The literature review presented above evidenced that the current research on the 
influence of directors’ education on banks’ performance is mainly focused on 
samples that considered US banks Boyd et al. (2011). Moreover, samples used in the 
current literature mainly consider publicly-listed banks or large banks, excluding 
small- and medium-sized banks. Furthermore, there is a tendency to only consider 
CEOs in the empirical studies. Therefore, in the present research, we include all the 
banks operating in a single European country (Portugal), as it allows comparing 
different types of banks based on their size.  
 
The first reason for choosing Portugal is the fact that this country experienced 
several problems in the banking system. Four banks, namely Banco Português de 
Negócios, Banco Privado Português, Banco Espirito Santo, and Banco Internacional 
do Funchal, have registered serious financial constraints since the global financial 
crisis in 2007. 
 
For the purpose of our study, we consider all the banks operating in a single country. 
In the case of Portugal, the banking system presents a number of banks from whom 
it is reasonable to hand collect available data. However, this would not have been 
feasible when bigger countries are considered. Besides, a sample is required for a 
such a study and it would not be possible to consider the entire population of a 
country, unlike in our study. Additionally, Portugal represents the particularities of a 
small country, as it differs from a large country like the US in terms of the many 
items analysed in the context. For example, Portuguese companies are small, 
typically family-owned, and are not publicly traded on the Portuguese stock index 
PSI-20. These aspects would probably affect corporate governance practices and 
thus, our choice of Portugal would help to examine what we intend to study. Based 
on this, a clear question at this stage is: by accepting the existence of significant 
particularities due to the size of different countries, do the results from (Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1999) and (Gottesman and Morey, 2006) hold for the case of a sample 
of banks in a small country? Based on the abovementioned studies, we claim that 
board members’ qualifications are important to ensure their managing abilities. The 
first hypothesis (H1) is formulated as follows: 
  
H1. Educational attainment and/or executive formation held by board members 
positively relate to banks’ financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1 refers to the resource dependence theory based on the principle that a 
bank’s board members use their resources (e.g. education) to make the best decisions 
that positively reinforce performance. Considering a multi-theory perspective (Boyd 
et al., 2011), we use H1 to simultaneously test if banks’ board members use their 
qualifications in their own interest. Thus, it means that board members’ 
qualifications could negatively affect a bank’s performance, which is close to the 
agency theory perspective. 
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2.2 Directors’ educational attainment acquired from prestigious universities 
correlates to banks’ financial performance 
 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) developed a strand in literature considering the 
possible effects of quality of training of directors on corporate performance. These 
authors found that mutual fund managers with MBAs from schools in the top 30 of 
Bloomberg Businessweek rankings of MBA programmes show superior 
performance when compared to mutual fund managers with non-ranked MBAs. 
They used scores of GMAT, SAT, and LSAT (Law School Admission Test) to 
measure the quality of training.  
 
Erkens and Bonner (2013) found that accounting financial experts hold lower 
director status than other directors by considering, for example, the variable Elite 
education. This research considered the appointments of accounting financial 
experts to the audit committees at S&P 1500 companies for the period between 1999 
and 2008. The variable Elite education used in this study considered two groups of 
the most prestigious universities in the US. The first group included Harvard 
University, Princeton University and Yale University. The second group was 
composed of Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Johns 
Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of 
Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and Williams College. Similarly, Badolato et al. 
(2014) found that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative 
status are associated with lower levels of earnings management. Therefore, results 
revealed that financial expertise has its own limitations and the status needs to be 
considered. 
 
However, considering the literature review regarding the association between the 
quality of training of directors of boards and banks’ financial performance it is 
obvious that it is limited and incomplete. The relevant article from Gottesman and 
Morey (2006) needs to be complemented with studies from other countries and 
applied specifically to banks. The use of global business school rankings is also an 
improvement in terms of research that can increase the generalization of results. 
Reflecting on the above contributions, this research aims to add new dimensions to 
the literature and implements a set of procedures to work towards this objective. 
 
In this study, to evaluate the quality of Portuguese business schools, we use the 
widely recognized Eduniversal ranking that considered only six Portuguese Business 
Schools in 2015, although only five have dean recommendation scores (Table 1). 
Based on the literature review, we conjecture that banks’ board members who hold 
qualifications from prestigious Portuguese universities may have better technical 
skills that improve their daily decisions on management, and this could affect banks’ 
performance positively. We propose the second hypothesis (H2) as follows: 
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H2. Degrees and/or executive formation (obtained from prestigious domestic 
business schools) held by board members relate positively to banks’ financial 
performance.  
 
We applied the basic premise of resource dependence theory in H2 to test the 
positive effect of bank board members’ qualifications on performance. To explain 
the negative effects in H2, we used the agency theory perspective, which refers to a 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
 
Table 1 Eduniversal Rankings 2015 (Portugal) 
5 Palmes of Excellence - Universal Business 
School with Strong Global Influence 
Rank by  
Palmes 
League 
Dean’s Recommendation 
Rate 2015 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa – Nova School 
of Business and Economics  
1 266‰ 
4 Palmes of Excellence - Top Business School 
with Strong Global Influence 
Rank by  
Palmes 
League 
Dean’s Recommendation 
Rate 2015 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa – Católica-
Lisbon School of Business & Economics  
1 250‰ 
3 Palmes of Excellence - Excellent Business 
School withStrong Global Influence 
Rank by  
Palmes 
League 
Dean’s Recommendation 
Rate 2015 
University of Porto – School of Economics and 
Management and Porto Business School 
1 188‰ 
ISCTE Business School – University Institute 
of Lisbon  
2 136‰ 
ISEG Lisboa – School of Economics and 
Management, Universidade de Lisboa  
3 101‰ 
2 Palmes of Excellence - Good Business School 
with Strong Global Influence 
Rank by  
Palmes 
League 
Deans’s 
Recommendation Rate 
2015 
AESE Escola de Direção e Negócios  1 - 
Source: Eduniversal Rankings. 
 
A professional who holds a degree from a prestigious foreign university is 
considered to be better prepared than one who obtained the degree from a 
Portuguese university. In the areas of business and economics, top Portuguese 
business schools recently edged closer to global standards by obtaining international 
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accreditations (AACSB, EQUIS, and AMBA). This is a relatively recent 
phenomenon because in 2008 only one Portuguese Business School (Católica Lisbon 
School of Business & Economics) was accredited by these three prestigious 
management education accreditation agencies. More recently, a Portuguese business 
school (Nova School of Business and Economics) was accredited with five levels of 
excellence, which Eduniversal titles the Palme of Excellence. Portugal has only six 
business schools in these rankings, which is reasonable considering the country’s 
population and comparing it with the average of other European countries.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a slight gap between the top-ranked universities in the US and 
in Portugal in the type and quality of knowledge, which affects the international 
academic recognition of Portuguese universities. This difference may be the 
outcome of fewer financial resources available for research and teaching in 
Portuguese universities. This reality exists because the scale is considerably different 
between Portugal and the US in terms of not only number of students but also 
number of academicians. Although both new technologies and information sharing 
can reduce this gap, the truth is that in some areas of business/economics it is 
difficult to expose students to certain teaching topics due to insufficient scale or 
financial resources. 
 
Owing to this reality, students prefer to study abroad by considering the reputation 
of a particular business school to improve their language skills and for international 
experience. In the case of Portugal, it is normal that students who go to study abroad 
look for universities in the US, the UK, and France. For H2, we used Eduniversal 
rankings to evaluate the quality of training in foreign universities. We predict that 
board members who hold qualifications from prestigious foreign universities have 
better technical skills to make daily management decisions that positively affect 
banks’ performance. We propose our third hypothesis (H3) as follows: 
  
H3. Degrees and/or executive formation (obtained from prestigious foreign business 
schools) held by board members relate positively to banks’ financial performance.  
 
On the one hand, for H3 we conjecture that a positive effect is justified by the 
resource dependence theory considering that managers use all available resources to 
benefit banks’ performance. On the other hand, considering H3, we believe that if a 
negative outcome is provided, an agency theory perspective may support the result. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1 Timeline 
 
This research was conducted using corporate governance data for the year 2011 as 
the Financial Assistance Programme to Portugal was negotiated during May of the 
same year. The referred programme was an agreement between four partners: the 
Portuguese government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
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Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB). The Financial Assistance 
Programme enforced several targets, for example, that for capital and liquidity to be 
accomplished by the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD) after 2011, a major state-
owned bank operating in Portugal. This research aims to assess if corporate 
governance data, in particular, board members’ qualifications affected banks’ 
performance in the following three years (2012–2014). For the period 2012–2014, it 
is assumed that board members were nominated for a three-year period and the 
rotation of board members was high. In fact, it is not usual that members of boards 
are nominated for the second three-year term; however, it was not expected during 
Portugal’s banking sector crisis. 
  
3.2 Sample of banks 
 
Data used in this research involved all Portuguese banks registered at the end of 
December 2011; in this case, 34 banks. However, in a few cases, information 
available for some banks is limited and some banks were excluded from the sample 
for reasons that will be explained later. Our final sample includes 25 banks which 
are representative, as 73.5% of all the banks operating in Portugal since 2011 are 
included in the sample. 
 
The majority of financial data were obtained from Moody’s Analytics BankFocus, a 
comprehensive global database containing information on public and private banks; 
biographical information on board members was collected from BoardEx database, 
which is a business intelligence tool. It was necessary to complement these data with 
information from banks’ annual reports. The databases were checked manually and 
several errors were identified. Data on board members comprised 276 elements but 
only 180 elements could be used in the research because 96 elements did not have 
sufficient information. For the 180 elements considered, some variables did not have 
adequate information. Furthermore, there were several limitations regarding the data 
used; in several cases, some board members were excluded from the sample. 
 
3.3 Construct measurement 
 
This analysis focuses on data from Portugal. The study did not face concerns of 
comparability of constructs as seen for multi-country studies. The Banco de Portugal 
is the central bank of the Portuguese Republic and regulates the country’s banking 
system in association with the European Central Bank, ensuring that the main rules 
are the same for all banks operating in the system. However, we exercised caution in 
the case of public-traded and state-owned banks as there are specific rules or 
recommendations that make these banks different from other types of banks. To deal 
with such concerns, we include two control variables, a dummy variable that 
considers if the bank is or not publicly-traded and a second dummy variable that 
considers if the bank is or not privately-owned. 
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3.4 Main variables 
 
3.4.1. Bank performance measures  
The main measures used for bank performance are ROAA and ROAE for the period 
between the end of 2012 and the end of 2014. Data were gathered from Moody’s 
Analytics BankFocus. These two ratios are widely used to measure the profitability 
of banks and are reliable for the present sample. In fact, the majority of banks in the 
analysis are not publicly-traded (21 out of 25). 
  
3.4.2. Board members’ qualifications  
This research is focused on assessing the possible outcomes of qualification of board 
members on bank performance, both in terms of quantity and quality. Therefore, 
three indices were considered to aggregate information on the academic 
qualifications of each board member. Eduindex aggregates the qualifications of 
board members. EduindexDP takes into consideration the quality of board members’ 
educational attainment obtained from prestigious domestic universities 
(Eduniversal). EduindexFP aggregates board members’ qualifications obtained in 
prestigious foreign universities (Eduniversal).  
 
The methodology used in this study is equivalent to the one used by Hau and Thum 
(2010), consisting of using indices to test the effects on losses made by German 
banks. First, every qualification that a board member holds is considered to have the 
value of 1 (similar to the format of a dummy variable). Second, all values of the 
dummy variables are summed in order to obtain the respective index. Finally, the 
sum of the dummy variables is divided by the number of board members. It is 
particularly relevant here that the best business schools operating in Portugal 
typically maintain this position over the years. Therefore, even if some board 
members obtained their qualifications a few decades ago, it is highly probable that 
the quality of these business schools did not change considerably. For example, 
according to (Eduniversal, 2012), Portugal’s top five business schools in 2012 
continued to deliver the same quality in 2017. 
  
3.4.3. Control variables  
The decision to include control variables in our study is based on the suggestions 
from Bernerth and Aguinis (2016). First, we assume that the selected control 
variable relates to those included in our study, meaning that a strong correlation may 
exist between them. Second, previous researchers also considered this proposition. 
Third, some studies found empirical relationships between the selected control 
variable and variables analysed in our study. Fourth, in our opinion, the selected 
control variables are partly essential to validate our empirical model. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, several studies have regularly used the natural log 
of total assets as a control variable, specifically to control the effects of firm size. 
This aspect can be seen in the studies developed by Kim (2005), Dunn and Sainty 
(2009), and Garcia-Meca et al. (2015). In the present study, the natural log of total 
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assets is an important variable because there are major size differences for banks 
operating in the Portuguese market.  
 
Moreover, a dummy variable is used to control the effect of ownership; the fact that 
a bank is state owned or privately owned could represent a significant effect on the 
performance of banks. In the case of Portugal, this is a relevant factor because the 
bank with a greater market share is completely state-owned Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos (CGD), and the inclusion of this variable is useful to test if there are any 
relevant differences. This variable was considered in corporate governance studies, 
as in the case of Kim (2005) and Liang et al. (2013). Therefore, state-owned banks 
normally have to fulfil additional requirements compared to privately owned banks. 
In Portugal, the board of directors of CGD normally follows the directions of the 
Portuguese government, which is represented by the Minister of Finance. 
 
The Portuguese banking system improved its equity levels, sometimes as 
recommended by the country’s respective Central Bank, but mandatory in other 
cases. Therefore, the bank’s board of directors has been dealing with the need for 
improving the bank’s equity levels to accomplish the previously defined rules. In 
this study, ‘Tier 1 ratio’ was included as a control variable with the objective of 
monitoring possible effects on the bank’s performance (even if the effect is only 
indirect). The use of ‘Tier 1 ratio’ is also considered a measure of risk; as stated by 
Kwan and Strahan (2004), firms with additional capital are assumed to be less risky. 
As a complementary measure of risk and to effectively control the possible effects of 
risk on banks performance, ‘“Risk 1’, representing the standard deviation of ROAA, 
was considered as a variable. The inclusion of ‘Risk 1’ is justified once the sample 
of banks is composed largely of non-listed banks as the use of measures such as 
Tobin’s Q is not allowed. However, we included a control variable ‘Public Traded 
Ownership’ to check if there are relevant differences between listed banks and non-
listed banks. 
 
We also consider that the period of analysis has a high probability of being affected 
by banks’ performance in the previous years, including the control variable ‘ROAE 
Crisis’ for the period 2009–2011 and the control variable ‘ROAA Crisis’ for the 
period 2009–2011, for checking this possible effect. These two ratios assume the 
format from Fitch/Moody’s Analytics BankFocus. All variables used in this study 
are compiled in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Definition of Variables 
Variables Measures 
Panel A: 
Dependent 
variables  
ROAA 
Net income/average total assets (Fitch/Moody’s Analytics BankFocus 
format) (years 2012–2014) 
ROAE Net income/average stockholders' equity (Fitch/Moody’s Analytics 
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BankFocus format) (years 2012–2014) 
  
Panel B: 
Board 
members’q
ualifications  
Eduindex 
Index that aggregates the qualifications of board's members in the areas of 
economics/business (year 2011) 
EduindexD
P 
Index that aggregates the qualifications of board's members obtained in 
domestic prestigious universities (areas of economics/business) (year 2011) 
EduindexFP 
Index that aggregates the qualifications of board's members obtained in 
foreign prestigious universities (areas of economics/business) (year 2011) 
  
Panel C: 
Other 
control 
variables  
Private 
Ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is privately-owned 
Public-
Traded 
Ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is publicly-traded 
Bank size Natural log of assets (years 2012–2014) 
ROAE 
Crisis  
Net income/average stockholders' equity (Fitch/Moody’s Analytics 
BankFocus format) (years 2009–2011) 
ROAA 
Crisis 
Net income/average total assets (Fitch/Moody’s Analytics BankFocus 
format) (years 2009–2011) 
Risk 1 Standard deviation of ROAA 
Tier 1 ratio Tier 1 ratio (years 2012–2014) 
 
 
3.5 Power analysis 
 
According to Boyd et al. (2017), the inclusion of power analysis is very rare in 
corporate governance studies. As these authors state, evaluating statistical power is 
significant considering the small effect sizes found in governance studies. Moreover, 
Boyd and Solarino (2016) found that effect sizes are normally low in the greater part 
of social science research.  
 
In our analysis, we conducted a priori power and sample size tests. First, we 
performed linear regression using ROAA as the dependent variable and the variables 
representing board members’ qualifications. Using Eduindex as an independent 
variable, we found an estimated power of 0.0997. Using EduindexDP as an 
independent variable the estimated power was 0.1582. However, when EduindexFP 
was used as the independent variable the estimated power was 0.9021. 
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We performed a similar power analysis considering ROAE as the dependent 
variable. For Eduindex, the estimated power is not applicable because the obtained 
R-squared is 0. Moreover, for EduindexDP, the estimated power is 0.0902 and for 
EduindexFP, it is 0.9519. Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the variable 
EduindexFP shows promising results in terms of affecting banks’ performance. The 
estimated powers would obviously be reduced when we introduce control variables 
in the empirical model. 
 
3.6 Endogeneity 
 
As proposed by Boyd et al. (2017), the inclusion of methods to control possible 
effects of endogeneity in corporate governance research is a general movement 
among academicians. Accordingly, being aware of the referred concerns regarding 
endogeneity, several tests to control these effects were included in our research. In 
this framework, based on Boyd et al. (2017), the most common methods are lagged 
designs, two-stage least squares, and instrumental variable approaches. 
 
Essentially, a few previous corporate governance research studies considered the use 
of controls for endogeneity. For example, (Harald and Marcel 2009) used the 
instrumental variables approach to capture the exogenous dynamics of the board 
structure. Moreover to perform hypotheses tests under weak instruments, (Harald 
and Marcel 2009) included the ‘conditional likelihood ratio’ (CLR) test. They also 
considered an additional test for robustness, limited-information maximum 
likelihood (LIML), for specifically testing boards’ competence variables.  
 
Thus, considering the need for obtaining results on this topic, the analysis requires 
the following developments. First, we consider a lagged design by using board 
members’ data from 2011 and evaluated its impact on banks’ financial performance 
during the period 2012–2014. The abovementioned structural analysis considers and 
presupposes that it takes time to implement management decisions. Consequently, a 
board member appointed in 2011 will make decisions that only produce effects in 
the subsequent years. Moreover, considering the number of years that a board 
member remains in the same position, a three-year term is typical, as per existing 
exemptions. As a result, it is reasonable to consider a three-year period for the 
possible effects of board member decisions on bank performance. Furthermore, 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) also considered lagged design in their research. We 
believe that the lagged design method protects our empirical model against potential 
endogeneity. Thus, it is unlikely that banks’ future performance may work as a 
decision criterion for the best qualified board members that could influence them to 
become attractive to the bank. Therefore, we think that a lagged design can protect 
our study against possible reverse causality effects. 
 
We verified if the covariance between ROAA and the error term is 0, when 
Eduindex is used as an independent variable. Our results prove that the value is 
effectively 0, confirming that the Eduindex variable is exogenous. We also obtained 
  V.M. Morais Pereira, J.A. Candeias Bonito Filipe 
 
61 
 
similar results for the variables EduindexDP and EduindexFP, confirming that these 
variables are exogenous. We calculated the covariance between ROAE and the error 
term, when Eduindex is used as an independent variable. We obtained 0 as the 
result, which determined that Eduindex is exogenous. We performed similar tests for 
EduindexDP and EduindexFP, and the results confirm that these variables are 
exogenous. 
 
These results also suggest that instrumental variables estimation is not required to 
deal with the possible effects of endogeneity. Additionally, in most cases, board 
members’ education was completed a few years ago and the decision to apply to 
those business schools is exogenous and does not depend on banks’ performance. 
 
3.7 Empirical methodology  
 
To examine the possible impact of the quality of board members’ training on banks’ 
financial performance, we applied the following generic model (1): 
 
ROAA or ROAE = β0 + β1Eduindex + β2EduindexDP + β3EduindexFP + 
β4Private + β5Publictraded + β6Banksize + β7ROAECrisis + β8ROAACrisis + 
β9Risk1 + β10Tier1ratio                                                                                          (1)                                                                                                          
 
All the variables included in the model are defined in Table 2. Initially, 34 banks 
were considered but due to the several limitations observed after obtaining data for 
some financial institutions, only 25 institutions were used for the final analysis. In 
the literature, Gottesman and Morey (2006) did not use a moderator effect in the 
relationship between fund managers’ characteristics and performance of funds. 
However, as stated by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), simple regressions of excess 
market returns on managerial characteristics is not enough. Therefore, it is very 
unlikely that the relationship between education and funds’ performance is strong 
enough to articulate the complete story.  
 
In our research, we assume that the previous perspective is also true once it is not 
believable that boards’ members’ education is enough to tell the complete story of 
banks’ financial performance. However, we believe that statistical relevance and 
practical significance of board members’ education may exist. In our model, we 
assume that board members holding degrees in economics/business studies would 
have better skills and be capable of making decisions benefiting banks’ performance. 
As stated by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), it is possible that fund managers benefit 
from business school alumni networks that provide better ways to gather relevant 
information (especially, the most prestigious schools). This particular aspect will be 
analysed in our study considering the business schools referred in Eduniversal 
Rankings.  
 
Our model considers a lag effect of one year between board members’ 
characteristics and bank performance because we believe that it takes time to see the 
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effect of managers’ decisions in terms of having a significant impact on the financial 
performance of banks. This methodology is very common in corporate governance 
research and was also used by Chevalier and Ellison (1999). We have also 
considered the possibility of including the Newey-West standard errors 
methodology, as in Chevalier and Ellison (1999). However, this methodology does 
not seem to be the best option that can be used in panel data studies, such as the case 
we study. Overall, Newey-West standard errors are a more appropriate methodology 
that can be used in time series data. In terms of changes in rankings over time, most 
prestigious business schools typically maintain their status. Thus, we consider that 
our methodology is robust in this respect. 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
 
We employed several robustness tests to assess the validity of our results. However, 
in view of space constraints, many of them are not reported in the tables. First, we 
consider a few tests to evaluate the normality of data, specifically the Shapiro-Wilk 
W-test and the Shapiro-Francia W’-test. Second, we describe how we deal with data 
imperfections, specifically missing data and outliers. Finally, we used quadratic 
effect terms to understand if they exert negative effects of Eduindex, EduindexDP, 
and EduindexFP on banks’ financial performance after certain levels. 
 
4.1 Normality of data 
 
We performed the Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W’ tests to evaluate if 
normality of data distribution. We apply these tests to the main variables of our 
model: ROAA, ROAE, Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP. The normal 
distribution hypothesis was rejected for ROAA, ROAE, Eduindex, and EduindexDP, 
but not for EduindexFP. We also performed skewness/kurtosis tests for normality. 
The hypothesis for normal distribution was rejected for ROAE, EduindexDP, and 
EduindexFP, but not for ROAA and Eduindex. 
 
Additionally, we regressed Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP on ROAA, and 
checked if the regression errors follow a normal distribution. The results for the 
Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W’tests showed that the errors are not 
normally distributed. We regressed Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP on 
ROAE and the regression errors did not follow a normal distribution. Therefore, we 
need to be careful when considering the statistical inference in linear regression 
analysis. An alternative would be to use generalized linear models or non-parametric 
methods, or transform variables using logs.  
 
Our approach is to consider the transformation of variables Eduindex, EduindexDP, 
and EduindexFP using logs and perform regressions that use ROAA and ROAE as 
dependent variables. Next, we checked if the regression errors are normally 
distributed. We tested if the residuals of ROAA on log (Eduindex) are normally 
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distributed using the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data. We rejected the 
hypothesis for normal distribution. 
 
As stated by Buthmann (2010), there are several reasons for the presence of data that 
are non- normally distributed. First, it can be due to extreme values, which implies 
the need for determining errors of measurement, data-entry, and outliers. Second, 
data may not be normally distributed because they result from a process that shifts 
frequently. We do not believe the previous condition applies to our data, as banks’ 
financial statements do not suffer from seasonality phenomena. Third, as 
emphasized by Buthmann (2010), it is essential to analyse if any variable presents 
many values close to zero or a natural limit. In our model, it is clear that our main 
independent variables Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP have zero as a 
natural limit. It may be important to consider using Box-Cox power transformations 
or natural logs of all variables. With regard to Box-Cox power transformations, it is 
important to emphasize that transformations in data will increase the difficulty of 
interpreting results. In fact, we believe that this methodology may not be the best 
option for our research. 
  
4.2 Data imperfections (outliers/missing data) 
 
We consider the presence of values that could differ substantially from other 
observations, namely outliers. According to Williams (2016), extreme values can 
produce distorted regression coefficients. Therefore, some strategies are required to 
deal with outliers to avoid possible model misspecifications.  
 
First, we consider the use of descriptive statistics for all the variables incorporated in 
the model. For independent variables, ROAE presents a standard deviation of 23.53, 
which is a considerably high value. This value can be attributed, for example, to the 
ROAE of Banif Bank with a value of -87.921% in 2012. We also registered an 
extreme value of -74.035% for Banif Investment Bank’s ROAE in 2014. It is also 
worth mentioning that standard deviation for the independent variable ‘ROAE 
Crisis’ is 12.66. This result is based on the performance analysis of Primus Bank; a 
value of -50% was obtained in 2009.  
 
Second, we incorporated Cooks’ distance after performing linear regressions and 
searching for values higher than 1. We performed Cooks ‘distance analysis 
considering ROAE as an independent variable; outliers were identified in a few 
situations. In a particular case when Cooks’ distance was considered to have a value 
greater than 1, it was not possible to identify any situation, indicating that there may 
not be any problem with outliers. We also considered an alternative option of using 
Cooks’ distance for detecting possible outlier problems for cases where Di > 4/n, 
with ‘n’ representing number of observations. In these last criteria, we detected a 
few possibilities for the presence of outliers in the cases of Banif Bank, Carregosa 
Bank, Banif Investment Bank, and BNP Paribas Personal Finance Bank.  
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Besides, in this study, we used certain methods to analyse the magnitude of missing 
values in our dataset. We recognise that statistical programmes such as Stata 
automatically remove missing values from any analysis, but the results can be 
affected if the presence of missing values is high. 
 
First, as suggested by (Institute for Digital Research and Education 2018) we use a 
Stata programme called ‘mdesc’, which counts the number of missing values and 
shows the percentage. The results show a value of 4.17% for the missing values of 
variables EduindexDP and EduindexFP representing, in this case, Banco Popular 
Portugal and are considered insignificant. Moreover, the variables ROAA, ROAE, 
and Eduindex show a percentage of missing values 0. 
 
Second, we consider the distribution of missing values across observations 
introducing the function ‘rmiss2’. We detected 69 observations with no missing 
values and 3 observations with 2 missing values. Summarizing, we deduce that the 
missing data do not significantly affect the results obtained in the present study. 
 
4.3 Quadratic effect terms 
 
In this section, we introduce quadratic effect terms to investigate if the impact of 
Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP on banks’ financial performance can have 
an inverted U-shaped form. If this aspect is valid for our econometric model, after 
considering a given level of board members’ qualifications, it may reveal that the 
effect will be negative for banks’ financial performance. 
 
Therefore, using the Hausman-Taylor estimation, we regressed ROAA or ROAE on 
the squared versions of Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP. We did not detect 
any significant effects of these regressions on these independent variables. 
Moreover, for squared EduindexDP, we observed that the coefficient presents a 
negative sign both for ROAA and ROAE. This result shows that after board 
members attain a certain level of qualifications, the impact on banks’ financial 
performance could turn negative. We believe that the referred phenomena resulted in 
less years of professional experience due to the time spent on educational 
attainments. 
 
4.4 Relationship between management competence and banks’ financial 
performance 
 
It is difficult to establish a relationship between management competence and banks’ 
financial performance. Structural equation modelling (SEM) with a moderator effect 
can establish this link. However, this type of analysis reveals serious limitations. 
Specifically, it is important to find a moderator variable to determine the reliability 
of the selected variable. We assume that even if there are many channels linking 
board members’ education and banks’ financial performance, the direct link between 
education and banks’ financial performance is not so naïve. Many relevant studies 
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Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gottesman and Morey (2006)) did not use the 
SEM model with a moderator effect but considered a direct link similar to the one 
we use. 
  
5. Reporting Results 
 
5.1 Summary descriptive statistics 
 
Summary statistics for all the variables are presented Table 3. The Table shows a 
strong standard deviation for ROAE with a value of approximately 23.53. 
Furthermore, the variable ‘ROAE Crisis’ also revealed a relevant standard deviation 
considering a value of 12.66. 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROAA 72 .0854983 0.1275 2.121537 -5.984 6.208 
ROAE 72 -3.147898 1.3325 23.5343 -87.921 35.227 
Eduindex 72 1.224104 1.1597 .4480756 0 2 
EduindexDP 69 .6883747 0.52 .489707 0 2 
EduindexFP 69 .415352 0.5 .3218005 0 1 
Private 72 .9166667 1 .278325 0 1 
Publictraded 72 .1388889 0 .3482575 0 1 
Banksize 72 14.96388 14.6232 1.947726 11.75796 18.57648 
ROAECrisis 63 .966836 3.077 12.66495 -50 20.352 
ROAACrisis 63 -.0026046 0.223 1.440712 -6.875 2.551 
Risk1 69 1.158742 0.6627 1.28936 .0818087 5.867265 
Tier1ratio 66 14.66333 11.95 6.339998 7.45 35.1 
 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between independent variables 
and control variables. Therefore, considering the correlation coefficients in Table 4, 
we do not identify any case that indicates the presence of a serious problem of 
multicollinearity because the pairwise correlations are below the threshold value of 
0.8. as stated in Fernandes et al. (2017b). However, we need to be careful with the 
correlation between the variables Eduindex and EduindexDP with a value of 0.6117 
and the correlation between the variables ROAACrisis and ROAECrisis with a value 
of 0.7282, as both are close to the threshold value of 0.8. 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 
We also need to be careful while using Pearson correlation coefficients among 
explanatory variables because these correlations should be used when the variables 
follow a normal distribution. In fact, Clark (2013) emphasized the idea that Pearson 
correlation is more adequate for variables that are continuous, normally distributed, 
and do not have extreme values. In the present study, we find that only one variable, 
‘EduindexFP’, assumes a normal distribution using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. 
Therefore, it may not be appropriate to use the Pearson’s correlation because the 
Spearman’s rank correlation method is a viable alternative. 
 
For variables Banksize, ROAECrisis, ROAACrisis, Risk1, and Tier1ratio, we use 
the Spearman’s correlation. We analysed to check if a monotonic relationship exists 
or not in all these cases. None of the variables present a monotonic relationship with 
the others, indicating that we need to apply another correlation, such as the 
Hoeffding’s D measure. However, the latter measure is far from being completely 
rigorous and we could not implement it in Stata. The alternative would be to use the 
measure devised by Blum et al. (1961); however, once again it is very difficult to 
implement it in Stata and, to the best of our knowledge, no author could easily work 
it out this way. 
 
5.2 Empirical results  
 
Our first objective is to show the possible effects of managers’ characteristics in 
terms of banks’ financial performance. We use an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression approach with several control variables, as reported in Table 5. We can 
see that a significant and positive effect of the variables Eduindex, EduindexDP, and 
EduindexFP exists for banks’ ROAA. This effect is higher for EduindexFP with a 
value of 2.986. It is also suggested that banks’ ROAE is significantly influenced by 
Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP. Again, the assumed influence is more 
remarkable for EduindexFP. However, the results do not consider possible effects of 
 Eduindex EduindexDP EduindexFP Private Publictraded Banksize ROAECrisis ROAACrisis Risk1 Tier1ratio 
Eduindex 1.0000          
EduindexDP 0.6117 1.0000         
EduindexFP 0.3906 0.3936 1.0000        
Private -0.3080 -0.2356 -0.0818 1.0000       
Public 
traded -0.1691 -0.1470 -0.0604 0.1211 1.0000      
Banksize -0.0991 0.1056 0.2174 
-
0.2470 0.5619 1.0000     
ROAECrisis 0.1745 0.4558 0.0239 
-
0.1517 -0.0361 0.1802 1.0000    
ROAACrisis 0.0484 0.4104 0.0282 -0.1890 0.0386 0.2312 0.7282 1.0000   
Risk 1 0.2309 0.1308 -0.4552 0.1074 -0.1371 -0.4288 -0.0246 0.0297 1.0000  
Tier1 ratio 0.2474 -0.1230 -0.1145 0.1095 -0.1628 -0.4210 0.0755 -0.2007 0.0199 1.0000 
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endogeneity and other statistical aspects. It is of particular concern that the adjusted 
R-squared value obtained in each regression is significantly high and not commonly 
observed in corporate governance studies.  
 
Table 5. OLS Performance Regressions with Control Variables 
  ROAA   ROAA   ROAA   ROAE   ROAE   ROAE 
Interce
pt 
1.87189
2  
3.26516
3  
1.56321
2  
50.541
39  
74.1578
7*  
52.8675
1 
 (0.58)  (1.05)  (0.62)  (1.27)  (1.84)  (1.62) 
Eduind
ex 
1.13127
6**      
15.426
84**     
 (2.19)      (2.43)     
Eduind
exDP   
1.21270
1***      
10.7874
4**   
   (2.98)      (2.04)   
Eduind
exFP     
2.98635
9***      
34.7411
7*** 
     (6.24)      (5.56) 
Private 
-
0,02285
75  
-
0.35492
83  
-
0.60897
02  
-
5.2721
95  
-
11.5050
8  
-
14.0146
5 
 (-0,03)  (-0.44)  (-0.94)  (-0.51)  (-1.09)  (-1.65) 
Publictr
aded 
-
0,00013
21  
0.19947
41  
0.37779
21  
5.4660
21  
7.68519
5  
10.5994
9 
 (-0,00)  (0.30)  (0.71)  (0.69)  (0.89)  (1.53) 
Banksi
ze 
-
0.27556
04  
-
0.32983
39**  
-
0.28694
41**  
-
4.6890
28**  
-
5,41178
4**  
-
5.00256
7*** 
 (-1.73)  (-2.08)  (-2.27)  (0.02)  (-2,63)  (-3.02) 
ROAE
Crisis 
-
0,05779
23**  
-
0.06263
68***  
-
0.04711
04***  
-
0.4357
882  
-
0.42813
98  
-
0.28987
75 
 (-2.65)  (-2.90)  (-2.8)  (-1.63)  (-1.52)  (-1.32) 
ROAA
Crisis 
1.08739
6***  
0.98107
49***  
1.00830
1***  
8.6312
48***  
7.44492
9***  
7.61893
*** 
 (5.66)  (5.19)  (6.68)  (3.66)  (3.03)  (3.86) 
Risk 1 
-
1,35832
8***  
-
1.24798
6***  
-
0.85542
37***  
-
16.800
8***  
-
14.7913
4***  
-
10.4375
9*** 
 (-5.94)  (-5.92)  (-4.89)  (-5.98)  (-5.39)  (-4.56) 
Tier1 
ratio 
0.16174
74***  
0.17634
87***  
0.19709
82***  
1.2965
72***  
1.48319
9***  
1.74517
4*** 
 (4.81)  (5.29)  (7.30)  (3.14)  (3.42)  (4.95) 
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Obs. 57  54  54  57  54  54 
            
Adj-R2 0.6059   0.6353   0.7660   0.5077   0.4896   0.6693 
The regression controls are bank size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Tier 
1 ratio. The table reports the regression coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), 
number of 
observations (N), and 
adjusted R2.          
* Statistical 
significance at 10% 
level.          
** Statistical 
significance at 5% 
level          
*** Statistical 
significance at 1% 
level          
 
Second, we incorporate a new methodology that considers heteroskedastic linear 
regressions (Table 6). Considering the effects of Eduindex, EduindexDP, and 
EduindexFP on banks’ ROAA, a positive and significant effect is confirmed as 
evidenced in the methodology that uses OLS regressions with control variables. 
Furthermore, for the effects of Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP on banks’ 
ROAE, the effect is positive and significant for the second and third referred 
variables. However, Eduindex does not have a significant impact on banks’ ROAE, 
which is contradictory to the result obtained in Table 5. 
  
Table 6. Heteroskedastic Linear Regression 
  ROAA#   ROAA   ROAA#   
ROAE
#   ROAE#   ROAE# 
Interce
pt 
9.25415
**  
9.36389
5***  
11.0165
9***  
-
62.505
37  
-
45.7124
8***  
18.9856
7 
 (2.21)  (3.89)  (2.94)  (-0.65)  (-3.12)  (0.64) 
Eduind
ex 
2.16799
2**      
19.940
36     
 (2.22)      (0.84)     
Eduind
exDP   
1.20636
9***      
13.7621
9***   
   (5.98)      (5.14)   
Eduind
exFP     
3.43723
5***      
32.0738
8*** 
     (7.41)      (8.41) 
Private -1.52335  
-
1.91625
1***  
-
2.02694
1***  
21.795
68***  
15.7144
3***  
-
10.9801
4*** 
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 (-1.61)  (-3.32)  (-4.09)  (2.69)  (5.24)  (-3.27) 
Publict
raded 
1.50362
2  
1.18842
5**  
1.61877
6***  
-
23.073
3***  
-
22.0405
1**  
7.84317
4 
 (1.40)  (2.20)  (4.30)  (-3.51)  (-2.08)  (1.12) 
Banksi
ze 
-
0.65979
26***  
-
0.61150
56***  
-
0.65965
55***  
1.5218
09  
1.15578
7**  
-
2.94507
5** 
 (-3.43)  (-6.17)  (-3.96)  (0.54)  (2.14)  (-2.24) 
ROAE
Crisis 
-
0.03792
39*  
-
0.05101
99***  
0.00406
02  
-
0.7070
614  
-
0.53023
57***  
-
0.35936
05 
 (-1.66)  (-2.60)  (0.13)  (-1.34)  (-3.33)  (-1.37) 
ROAA
Crisis 
0.91613
47*  
0.84319
27**  
0.37689
28**  
10.890
03*  
5.07571
6***  
7.6305*
** 
 (1.83)  (2.18)  (2.32)  (1.85)  (4.76)  (5.69) 
Risk 1 -2.24263  
-
1.56473
2**  
-
1.38116
9***  
-
10.558
4  
-
5.22543
9**  
-
9.74463
*** 
 (-1.37)  (-2.32)  (-2.78)  (-1.17)  (-2.06)  (-5.31) 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.09861
9  
0.16325
55***  
0.01276
14  
0.6563
149  
1.08083
5**  
1.83535
2*** 
 (1.52)  (3.20)  (0.24)  (0.43)  (2.57)  (3.55) 
Obs. 57  54  54  57  54  54 
Wald 
chi2(8) 68.47  246.6  237.71  233.29  527.84  925.4 
Prob > 
chi2 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
The regression controls are bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Tier 1 
ratio. The table reports the regression coefficients, z-statistics (in parentheses), 
number of 
observations (N).           
* Statistical 
significance at 10% 
level.          
** Statistical 
significance at 5% 
level          
*** Statistical 
significance at 1% 
level          
# In this case, the likelihood-ratio test reported at the bottom of the table shows us that 
our model of variance fits the data better than a model where the variance is constant. 
 
Third, our empirical analysis includes a linear regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE), which can be referred to as an alternative feasible 
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generalized least squares (FGLS) method to deal with disturbances that are not 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. This methodology can be 
particularly interesting when considering that our variables are not normally 
distributed. First, we detect a significant effect of Eduindex, EduindexDP, and 
EduindexFP on banks’ ROAA, and this confirms our previous results. A positive 
and significant effect of Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP is also identified 
for banks’ ROAE, but it is emphasized that the magnitude of influence is much 
higher for EduindexFP. Again, we are aware that the R-squared in the various 
regressions presents values that are not common in corporate governance research. 
This final aspect implies that we need to be careful while interpreting the results. 
 
Table 7. Linear Regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
  ROAA   ROAA   ROAA   ROAE   ROAE   ROAE 
Interce
pt 
1.87189
2  
3.26516
3**  
1.56321
2  
50.5413
9***  
74.1578
7**  
52.8675
51** 
 (1.62)  (1.90)  (0.89)  (2.81)  (2.48)  (2.21) 
Eduind
ex 
1.13127
6***      
15.4268
4***     
 (2.89)      (3.43)     
Eduind
exDP   
1.21270
1***      
10.7874
4***   
   (6.40)      (8.64)   
Eduind
exFP     
2.98635
9***      
34.7411
7*** 
     (19.15)      (6.99) 
Private 
-
0.02285
75  
-
0.35492
83  
-
0.60897
02*  
-
5.27219
5  
-
11.5050
8  
-
14.0146
5 
 (-0.11)  (-0.72)  (-1.92)  (-1.31)  (-1.53)  (-2.54) 
Publict
raded 
-
0.00013
21  
0.19947
41  
0.37779
21  
5.46602
1  
7.68519
5  
10.5994
9*** 
 (-0.00)  (0.42)  (0.93)  (1.22)  (1.55)  (3.16) 
Banksi
ze 
-
0.27556
04***  
-
0.32983
39***  
-
0.28694
41***  
-
4.68902
8***  
-
5.41178
4***  
-
5.00256
7*** 
 (-3.60)  (-4.25)  (-3.09)  (-4.10)  (-3.75)  (-3.77) 
ROAE
Crisis 
-
0.05779
23*  
-
0.06263
68**  
-
0.04711
04*  
-
0.43578
82*  
-
0.42813
98**  
-
0.28987
75** 
 (-1.91)  (-1.84)  (-1.84)  (-1.93)  (-2.07)  (-2.06) 
ROAA
Crisis 
1.08739
6***  
0.98107
49***  
1.00830
1***  
8.63124
8***  
7.44929
***  
7.61983
*** 
 (2.90)  (3.03)  (3.16)  (3.42)  (4.25)  (4.28) 
Risk 1 -  -  -  -  -  -
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1.35832
8*** 
1.24798
6*** 
0.85542
37*** 
16.8008
*** 
14.7913
4*** 
10.4375
9*** 
 (-12.30)  (-9.75)  (-8.31)  (-7.90)  (-23.00)  (-19.39) 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.16174
74***  
0.17634
87***  
0.19709
82***  
1.29657
2***  
1.48319
9***  
1.74517
4*** 
 (4.86)  (5.95)  (6.45)  (7.16)  (9.73)  (12.09) 
Obs. 57  54  54  57  54  54 
R-
squared 0.6622   0.6904   0.8013   0.578   0.5666   0.7193 
The regression controls are bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Tier 
1 ratio. The table reports the regression coefficients, z-statistics (in parentheses), 
number of 
observations (N).           
* Statistical 
significance at 
10% level.           
** Statistical 
significance at 5% 
level           
*** Statistical 
significance at 1% 
level           
 
Fourth, our empirical analysis uses a random-effects model (Table 8) that is widely 
used in corporate governance research. This methodology is useful to control 
variables that cannot be observed, as in the case of cultural factors or differences in 
business practices across banks. As stated by Torres-Reyna (2017), fixed effects will 
not work well with slow-changing variables over time, as it is the case of our study. 
Using the Hausman test to decide if we should use fixed effects or random effects 
seems redundant because it is not expected that fixed effects are appropriate to our 
econometric model. Therefore, as mentioned by Black et al. (2016), fixed effects 
should not be used to study governance aspects with little time variation, for 
example, ownership structure. In this context, board members’ education can be 
considered as having little time variation. 
 
Furthermore, as Torres-Reyna (2017) states, it is important to decide if it is 
necessary to use a random effects regression or a simple OLS regression. Therefore, 
we use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) to define the previous situation. 
Moreover, as emphasized by Torres-Reyna (2017) in a research study that involves 
consideration of macro panels with long time series of over 20 years, cross-sectional 
dependence could be a concern and it is useful to perform the Breusch-Pagan LM 
test of independence. However, since we are using a micro panel (few years) in our 
research, applying macro panels with long time series is not appropriate.  
 
Our analysis revealed a positive and significant effect of variables Eduindex, 
EduindexDP, and EduindexFP for banks’ ROAA and ROAE. Besides, when 
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applying the Breusch-Pagan LM test, we confirmed that the random effects model is 
a better option than OLS regressions. Likewise, the impact of EduindexFP on banks’ 
ROAA and ROAE is greater than Eduindex and EduindexDP. 
 
Table 8. Random Effects Regression (Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
Test) 
  ROAA#   ROAA#   ROAA#   ROAE#   ROAE#   ROAE# 
Inter
cept 3.293498  4.359035  1.565589  
102.3855
*  
123.3024
**  
84.24177
* 
 (0.82)  (1.14)  (0.52)  (1.86)  (2.21)  (1.91) 
Edui
ndex 0.9716451*      
13.25648
**     
 (1.89)      (2.03)     
Edui
ndex
DP   
1.179997*
**      
12.73032
**   
   (3.54)      (2.51)   
Edui
ndex
FP     
2.986677**
*      
35.24267
*** 
     (8.73)      (3.36) 
Priv
ate -0.0506362  
-
0.2185689  -0.6079526  -8.580795  -12.0116  -15.12276 
 (-0.06)  (-0.21)  (-0.98)  (-0.55)  (-0.69)  (-1.20) 
Publ
ictra
ded 0.6120304  0.6990258  0.3799867  
24.60319
***  
26.30287
***  
21.88163
*** 
 (1.35)  (1.43)  (0.75)  (4.18)  (4.71)  (3.30) 
Ban
ksiz
e 
-
0.3461887*  
-
0.3930716
**  
-
0.2871149*
*  
-
7.46697*
**  
-
8.264426
***  
-
6.730169
*** 
 (-1.79)  (-2.24)  (-2.05)  (-2.60)  (-2.82)  (-2.84) 
RO
AE
Crisi
s 
-
0.0331977*  
-
0.0384678
**  
-
0.0470034*
**  
-
0.222067
5  
-
0.235805
8  
-
0.249715
4 
 (-2.01)  (-2.55)  (-3.08)  (-0.92)  (-0.96)  (-1.09) 
RO
AA
Crisi
s 
0.796396**
*  
0.769847*
**  
1.006919**
*  
4.886026
***  
4.565355
***  
5.947768
*** 
 (4.02)  (4.49)  (6.70)  (3.80)  (3.71)  (4.91) 
Risk 
1 
-
1.290461**
*  
-
1.23859**
*  
-
0.8550251*
**  
-
17.02294
***  
-
16.16475
***  
-
11.0853*
** 
 (-4.85)  (-5.60)  (-6.54)  (-5.82)  (-6.24)  (-6.03) 
Tier 
1 
0.1391857*
*  
0.1502743
***  
-
0.85500251  
0.788364
3  
0.838989
3*  
1.333388
*** 
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ratio *** 
 (2.20)  (2.64)  (4.24)  (1.53)  (1.70)  (2.63) 
Obs. 57  54  54  57  54  54 
R-
squa
red 
(ove
rall) 0.6428   0.6761   0.8013   0.4813   0.4855   0.6829 
The regression controls are bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Tier 1 ratio. The 
table reports the regression coefficients, z-statistics (in parentheses), 
number of 
observations (N).           
* Statistical 
significance at 10% 
level.           
** Statistical 
significance at 5% 
level           
*** Statistical 
significance at 1% 
level           
#In this case, the random effects 
model is better than OLS         
 
Fifth, considering that variables are not normally distributed, nonparametric 
regression can be considered as it has the advantage of not being subject to 
misspecification errors. Therefore, based on the Stata (2018) outcomes, we do not 
specify the functional form in the nonparametric regression. We are also aware that 
nonparametric regressions require a greater number of observations than linear 
regressions to generate more rigorous estimates. We performed nonparametric 
regressions using dependent variables (ROAE and ROAA) and independent 
variables individually (Eduindex, EduindexDP, and EduindexFP). However, when 
control variables were included in the nonparametric regression, we could not 
compute a bootstrap due to insufficient observations. The results for nonparametric 
regression are reported in Table 9. The estimates suggest that EduindexFP affects 
banks’ ROAA and ROAE significantly and positively. The interpretation of these 
results has a set of limitations and should be cautiously considered.  
 
Table 9. Nonparametric Regression 
  ROAA   ROAA   ROAA   ROAE   
ROA
E   ROAE  
Intercept 
-
0.0168
11  
0.25798
08  0.142359  
-
3.3667
03  
-
1.587
89  
-
3.222266  
 (-0.07)  (0.91)  (0.61)  (-1.46)  
(-
0.66)  (-1.12)  
Eduinde
x 
0.6418
138      
5.8654
94      
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 (0.94)      (0.75)      
Eduinde
xDP   
-
0.24727
47      
2.583
264    
   (-0.33)      (0.41)    
Eduinde
xFP     
2.445652
***      
30.23434
***  
     (2.92)      (3.41)  
Obs. 69  69  69  69  69  69  
             
R-
squared 0.0072   0.1270   0.1687   0.0216   
0.137
2   0.1638  
The regression controls are bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, 
Tier 1 ratio. The table reports the regression coefficients, z-statistics (in parentheses),  
number of 
observations (N) and 
adjusted R2.           
* Statistical significance at 10% 
level.         
** Statistical 
significance at 5% 
level           
*** Statistical significance at 1% 
level          
 
Sixth, our analysis considered the inclusion of a Hausman-Taylor regression. This 
regression fits a random-effects model for panel data considering that part of the 
covariates correlates with the unobserved individual-level random effects. The 
Hausman-Taylor regression results are reported in Table 10. The results reveal that 
EduindexFP affects banks’ ROAA positively and significantly, but does not affect 
ROAE.  
 
Table 10. Hausman-Taylor Regression 
  ROAA   ROAA   ROAA   ROAE   ROAE   ROAE 
Interce
pt 6.14694  
7.10437
8  
4.62721
7  
125.905
8**  
157.924
3**  
119.082
5** 
 (0.86)  (1.17)  (0.81)  (1.97)  (2.49)  (1.82) 
Eduind
ex 1.78485      
37.1526
9     
 (1.15)      (1.61)     
Eduind
exDP   
1.52328
8      
32.0297
8   
   (1.43)      (1.61)   
Eduind
exFP     
4.97638
5*      
80.1778
7 
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     (1.73)      (1.49) 
Private 
-
0.24798
11  
-
0.37834
4  
-
0.89916
04  
-
9.62061  
-
12.9896
1  
-
22.8525
7 
 (-0.17)  (-0.28)  (-0.99)  (-0.51)  (-0.67)  (-1.26) 
Publictr
aded 
1.36271
5***  
1.26204
4***  
1.34559
7***  
31.4298
9***  
32.0644
2***  
32.3508
1*** 
 (4.35)  (3.55)  (4.19)  (4.18)  (4.27)  (4.01) 
Banksi
ze 
-
0.52721
8*  
-
0.53628
42**  
-
0.48548
45**  
-
10.1228
3***  
-
10.8419
2***  
-
9.62673
6*** 
 (-1.68)  (-1.98)  (-2.13)  (-3.08)  (-3.10)  (-2.95) 
ROAE
Crisis 
-
0.01506
17  
-
0.02139
25  
-
0.02120
85  
-
0.16663
95  
-
0.19787
31  
-
0.18268
99 
 (-0.95)  (-1.36)  (-1.24)  (-0.76)  (-0.90)  (-0.80) 
ROAA
Crisis 
0.53618
02**  
0.58453
49***  
0.64797
99***  
3.75778
7*  3.49725  
4.28801
5** 
 (2.45)  (2.96)  (3.67)  (1.77)  (1.64)  (1.94) 
Risk 1 
-
1.54778
5***  
-
1.37283  
-
0.76390
34*  
-
22.8176
1***  
-
19.2851
2***  
-
8.86676
8 
 (-2.93)  
(-
3.92)**
*  (-1.90)  (-3.79)  (-3.74)  (-1.30) 
Tier 1 
ratio 
0.08353
23  
0.10648
36  
0.13170
31  
0.30358
95  
0.47310
16  
0.80073
99 
 (0.89)  (1.27)  (1.47)  (0.54)  (0.86)  (1.39) 
            
Obs. 57  54  54  57  54  54 
            
rho 
0.87954
303   
0.80010
057   
0.76158
928   
0.84590
647   
0.86197
064   
0.83143
671 
The regression controls are bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, Tier 
1 ratio. The table reports the regression coefficients, z-statistics (in parentheses), 
number of 
observations (N).           
* Statistical significance at 10% 
level.         
** Statistical significance at 5% 
level         
*** Statistical 
significance at 1% 
level          
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Finally, we could have introduced alternative methodologies in our study. It would 
also be interesting to consider a methodology that includes instrumental variables. 
However, we could not find suitable instrumental variables to include in this 
econometric model. For this reason, we decided that it was not convenient to follow 
this path. 
 
5.3 Power analysis for non-significant results 
 
As mentioned by Boyd et al. (2017), power analysis should be considered for non-
significant results, specifically for cross-sectional datasets, as in the case of the 
present research. Moreover, this aspect is applicable for smaller sample sizes, as 
ensued in our research. We perform power analysis for nonparametric regression, 
which we considered to be particularly consistent for our study even if it does not 
include control variables. We identified two independent variables and registered 
non-significant results, as in the case of Eduindex and EduindexDP. When 
considering ROAA as a dependent variable and Eduindex as an independent 
variable, the estimated power is 0.1073. Additionally, when ROAE is taken as the 
dependent variable and Eduindex as an independent variable, the estimated power is 
0.2294. With ROAA as the dependent variable and EduindexDP as an independent 
variable, the estimated power is 0.8775. Finally, considering ROAE as the 
dependent variable and EduindexDP as an independent variable, the estimated 
power is 0.904. 
 
5.4 Concerns about HARKing 
 
Boyd et al. (2017) emphasized avoiding the practice of HARKing (Hypothesizing 
After the Results are Known), and we have followed this interpretation in our study. 
Correspondingly, we do not eliminate non-significant hypotheses after obtaining our 
results. We do not select a specific methodology to confirm our theory, instead of 
using statistical methodologies that we consider more reliable to analyse our 
hypotheses. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
Research that focuses on the impact of the educational attainment of boards’ 
members on banks’ financial performance is limited in the literature. Previous 
studies mainly focused on US data and the non-financial sector. A greater part of the 
studies does not consider the quality of training of board members. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study emphasizing all the previous aspects 
simultaneously in a context in which all the banks of a specific country are analysed. 
In the present study, we used three indices as proxies for the educational 
qualifications of banks’ board members, namely Eduindex for all the qualifications 
acquired in the areas of business or economics; EduindexDP for all the qualifications 
obtained in prestigious domestic business schools; and EduindexFP for all the 
qualifications acquired in prestigious foreign business schools. Moreover, two 
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measures of banks’ performance are used as the dependent variables, namely ROAA 
and ROAE. 
 
The present research finds that in some cases board members’ educational 
attainment affects banks’ performance. Therefore, it is relevant that EduindexFP 
affects banks’ financial performance positively and significantly in most of the 
statistical methods we used. When Eduindex and EduindexDP are considered to 
affect banks’ financial performance, the results obtained are not consistent with the 
statistical methods we used. Furthermore, the results allow us to conclude that only 
qualifications achieved by banks’ board members in prestigious foreign business 
schools can have a positively significant impact on banks’ financial performance. 
 
Findings in this paper have important policy implications. Specifically, the 
prudential supervision developed by Banco de Portugal in association with the 
European Central Bank should follow a more rigorous process while selecting board 
members of banks. Even though it is not mandatory, it is recommended that 
directors of boards should have a few members qualified from top foreign business 
schools. Members’ international experience, language skills, and contact with 
knowledge state-of-the-art are areas that can influence banks’ performance 
positively.  
 
It is suggested that future research compare data from multiple countries, namely in 
the euro area. We also think that it would be worth considering other international 
rankings, namely business school rankings from the Financial Times. Finally, for 
bigger samples, questionnaires can be used to collect data, principally for smaller 
banks where information is limited. 
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